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Fig. 1 | BMC Bioinformatics

Fig. 1

From: A covert authentication and security solution for GMOs

Fig. 1

ZK proof of knowledge to verify authenticity. The prover and verifier are given the public input, an alleged signature (K 1,K 2)=μ with z=K 1, and the message (signature data) m. If \(\mu ={\mathcal {E}}(\sigma)\) is generated as above, then t 1=(s ·σ)e and t 2=(g s+r,s σ·y s+r) where s is the randomness used in ElGamal to encrypt s , and r is that used to encrypt σ. In this case, the protocol allows the prover to confirm the signature in ZK. If μ is a falsely implied signature, the protocol allows the prover to deny the signature in ZK

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